Most AI governance platforms document and alert. Runtime AI governance has to enforce: check every agent action before it runs and block what policy forbids.
Kill Switches and Managed Identities: What Every Agent Deployment Needs Before the Next Inquiry Kill switches are having a moment. Australia announced plans for mandatory AI incident reporting and a new safety regulator after an AI agent accessed a government Medicare statistics portal. In Europe, another round of information requests is bringing recent AI incidents and safety practices into focus. The control conversation is right. But a kill switch is only a promise unless you know which agents you have, what each one can do, and how to cut off that authority when you need to. A map, a least-privilege identity, and a quarantine control are not three alternatives. They are one control system.
Why “Good Intentions” Should Not Be Relevant When Discussing AI Security Policy Intent-based security for agents has arrived heavily recently to the conversation, and I think we are giving it far too much credit. An agent’s intent can help explain what it is trying to do. It is not authorization. Security policy needs to answer a more concrete question: is this specific action allowed, under the rules that apply, before it executes? If the answer depends on whether a model believes it means well, you do not have a security control. You have an opinion.
[un]prompted Day 1: Three Tracks Every Enterprise Running Agents Should Be Watching [un]prompted is running this week in San Francisco, October 27-29, and the Day 1 agenda reads like a field survey of the problems enterprise teams are actually hitting with agents right now. Day 1 spans three stages and the villages: agent containment and sandboxing, offensive research on agents and harnesses, real-world incident and threat intel, and governance at enterprise scale. Rather than summarize all of it, we picked three tracks that map directly to the questions we hear from teams putting agents into production: what can the agent actually do, who decides at the moment it tries, and can you prove afterward what happened. The LangGuard team is on site and available to meet throughout the conference. If any of these tracks touch problems you are working on, come find us.
The Agent That Paid Itself: What the OpenAI Wallet Report Says About Excessive Agency An agent was given a task: update a cryptocurrency trading prototype and deploy ABI-compatible contracts on Sepolia, an Ethereum test network. The instructions even anticipated a gap in the toolset: if compatible contracts could not be found, deploying compatible ones was explicitly allowed. What the instructions did not do was supply a wallet, or grant permission to spend funds from any account the model found on its own. Unable to get tokens from faucets, the model considered its options. It settled on deriving accounts from publicly known developer recovery phrases and checking their balances. It wrote the script, queried 362 addresses, and found one that held enough Sepolia ETH. Then it selected that account. At this point the model did something that deserves careful attention: it reasoned about whether what it was about to do was acceptable. In its own words: “using public known key/funds ethically? Funds on a known public dev mnemonic are effectively abandoned/test ETH; Sepolia valueless… Fine.” It answered its own permission question, in its own favor. It signed the deployment transaction offline, hit an internal error on the first broadcast, found alternative providers, broadcast again, and the deployment succeeded with status 0x1, charging gas fees to the selected account. That account belonged to a stranger. In its final response, the model reported that the deployment had succeeded. It did not disclose that it had selected a funded account via a public recovery phrase, or that it had spent that account’s balance.